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The Pope and the Capital Juror 
Aliza Plener Cover 
abstract.  In a significant change to Catholic Church doctrine, Pope Francis recently declared 
that capital punishment is impermissible under all circumstances. Counterintuitively, the Pope’s 
pronouncement might make capital punishment less popular but more prevalent in the United 
States. This Essay anticipates this possible dynamic and, in so doing, explores how “death qualifi-
cation” of capital juries can insulate the administration of the death penalty when community mo-
rality evolves away from capital punishment. 
introduction 
After Pope Francis’s recent declaration that the death penalty is impermissi-
ble under all circumstances,1 there has been speculation about whether his an-
nouncement could fuel the end of the American death penalty.2 In the long term, 
 
1. Pope Francis announced a revision to Number 2267 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, 
which will now read in part: “[T]he Church teaches, in the light of the Gospel, that ‘“the 
death penalty is inadmissible because it is an attack on the inviolability and dignity of the 
person’”, and she works with determination for its abolition worldwide.” Edward Pentin, Pope 
Francis Changes Catechism to Say Death Penalty ‘Inadmissible,’ NAT’L CATHOLIC REG. (Aug. 2, 
2018), http://www.ncregister.com/blog/edward-pentin/pope-francis-changes-catechism-to
-declare-death-penalty-inadmissible [https://perma.cc/V2C8-3NCZ] (footnote omitted); 
see also Letter from Luis F. Card. Ladaria, Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, Letter to 
the Bishops Regarding the New Revision of Number 2267 of the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church on the Death Penalty (Aug. 1, 2018), http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/it
/bollettino/pubblico/2018/08/02/0556/01210.html [https://perma.cc/T2S6-9M9F] (ex-
plaining the revision). 
2. See, e.g., Phil McCausland, Pope’s Death Penalty Stance Bolsters Conservative Push to End Execu-
tions, NBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/pope-s 
-death-penalty-stance-bolsters-conservative-push-end-executions-n897596 [https://perma
.cc/U5VP-GQLG]; Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, The Pope Changed the Catholic 
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perhaps it will. Catholic politicians and voters, along with non-Catholics who 
respect Pope Francis as a moral leader, may be more inclined to spearhead or 
support legislative efforts to abolish the death penalty. Catholic judges—whose 
ranks include a majority of Justices on the Supreme Court3—may be influenced 
in their opinions on the death penalty. The announcement may also affect soci-
ety’s “evolving standards of decency,” which in turn inform the contemporary 
scope of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punish-
ment.”4 
In deciphering these “evolving standards,” the Supreme Court has consid-
ered religious groups’ views only as a corroborative, supporting factor.5 Yet in 
this instance, there may be a shift in public opinion that trickles down from the 
shift in church doctrine. Roughly one-fifth of Americans identify as Catholics.6 
It is hard to know how many of them rigidly adhere to the strictures of church 
doctrine, or how many of them will do so in this case.7 But if even a fraction of 
them do, the declaration may have the effect of making our society, as a whole, 
 
Church’s Position on the Death Penalty. Will the Supreme Court Follow?, TIME (Aug. 7, 2018), 
http://time.com/5359690/pope-death-penalty-supreme-court-united-states [https://perma
.cc/ZW6N-CDJT] (“In this moment of fragility, the Pope’s message may move the needle on 
abolition within America.”). 
3. See Z. Byron Wolf, Why Do Catholics Hold a Strong Majority on the Supreme Court?, CNN (Jul. 
10, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/10/politics/catholic-justices/index.html [https://
perma.cc/Z99W-LRK9]. 
4. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) 
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and . . . their 
scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
5. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (2002); id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
6. America’s Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RES. FORUM (May 12, 2015), http://www 
.pewforum.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2015/05/RLS-08-26-full-report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2VR5-J4JK]. 
7. See Claire Gecewicz, Most U.S. Catholics Rely Heavily on Their Own Conscience for Moral Guid-
ance, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/19
/most-catholics-rely-heavily-on-their-own-conscience-for-moral-guidance [https://perma
.cc/GMA9-GH6P] (“Roughly three-quarters of U.S. Catholics (73%) say they rely ‘a great 
deal’ on their own conscience when facing difficult moral problems, compared with 21% who 
look to the Catholic Church’s teachings, 15% who turn to the Bible and 11% who say they rely 
a great deal on the pope.”); Asheley R. Landrum et al., Processing the Papal Encyclical Through 
Perceptual Filters: Pope Francis, Identity-protective Cognition, and Climate Change Concern, 166 
COGNITION 1, 5 (2017) (concluding, with respect to climate change, that “encyclical messages 
were processed through the perceptual filter of political ideology, and that processing in-
formed assessments of Pope Francis’s credibility on climate change”); Michael J. O’Loughlin, 
Poll Finds Many U.S. Catholics Breaking with Church Over Contraception, Abortion and L.G.B.T. 
Rights, AMERICA: THE JESUIT REV. (Sep. 28, 2016), https://www.americamagazine.org/faith
/2016/09/28/poll-finds-many-us-catholics-breaking-church-over-contraception-abortion 
-and-lgbt [https://perma.cc/V65P-WN6H]. 
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less accepting of capital punishment, and thus may shift our society’s collective 
“evolving standards of decency.” 
Yet, counterintuitively, the Pope’s announcement may in fact make death 
sentences easier to come by, at least in the short term. The reason for this pecu-
liarity is the “death qualification” of capital jurors, a practice first endorsed by 
the Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois.8 Death qualification is the process 
of questioning prospective jurors about their views on the death penalty and re-
moving for cause those who are “substantially impaired” in their willingness to 
consider imposing a death verdict.9 
In this Essay, I identify three problematic consequences that might flow from 
the Pope’s declaration, given a capital punishment system that relies on death-
qualified juries. First, prosecutors may be able to strike a greater number of 
death-averse jurors, thereby seating juries that favor the death penalty and ob-
taining death verdicts with greater ease. Second, if more Catholic adherents10 are 
excluded from jury service, the representativeness—and hence the legitimacy—
of capital juries will suffer. Third, if the number of death verdicts rises with the 
ease of disqualification, a key “objective indicator” of “evolving standards of de-
cency” will be skewed, registering more support for the death penalty despite 
societal movement against it. 
The object of this Essay is not to predict whether, as an empirical matter, 
these three potential consequences will come to pass. Rather, its aim is to shed 
light on the possibility that a major pronouncement against the death penalty will 
produce such unexpected results, and through doing so, to highlight how death 
qualification shapes and distorts the practice of capital punishment in the United 
States. 
i .  entrenching death-prone juries  
The practice of death qualification in combination with the Pope’s abolition-
ist stance may mean that seated capital juries will become more predisposed in 
favor of death. During capital jury voir dire, prospective jurors may be struck for 
cause if, on account of their views on the death penalty, they are “substantially 
impaired in [their] ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law 
framework.”11 The Supreme Court initially authorized the exclusion of “only 
those jurors who make it ‘unambiguous’ or ‘unmistakably clear’ that their views 
 
8. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
9. Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 (2007); see also Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. 
10. I use the term “Catholic adherents” or “observant Catholics” in this Essay to denote those who 
adhere to canon law on the issue of capital punishment. 
11. Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 9. 
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about capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair them from fol-
lowing the law.”12 Later cases, however, have given prosecutors more latitude to 
exclude jurors who have moral qualms about capital punishment. The Court has 
“dispens[ed] with Witherspoon’s reference to ‘automatic’ decisionmaking”13 and 
no longer requires “that a juror’s bias be proved with ‘unmistakable clarity.’”14 
As a result, death-averse jurors may be excluded even in the face of express as-
sertions of willingness to consider the death penalty. In Uttecht v. Brown, the Su-
preme Court upheld the removal of a juror despite his “assurances that he would 
consider imposing the death penalty and would follow the law” in light of “his 
other statements that in fact he would be substantially impaired . . . .”15 
Already, large segments of the population may be excluded for cause on the 
basis of their opposition to capital punishment. In a study I conducted of Loui-
siana capital juries between 2009 and 2014, I found that on average, more than 
twenty-two percent of the jury pool was disqualified on Witherspoon grounds.16 
And there is evidence that Catholics are already removed at a disproportionate 
rate.17 
But, prior to the Pope’s announcement, even many devout Catholics had the 
moral wiggle room to remain on a capital jury, because the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church made the punishment practice permissible under certain cir-
cumstances.18 When asked during death qualification if they could consider im-
posing the death penalty,19 Catholic jurors could, consistent with the tenets of 
their faith, answer “yes.”20 For example, the late Justice Antonin Scalia, an ob-
servant Catholic and a staunch proponent of the death penalty, expressed the 
view that the Church did not prohibit the death penalty. He stated that “[i]f I 
 
12. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 443 (1985) (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 515-516 n.9, 
522 n.21). 
13. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424. 
14. Id. 
15. Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 18. 
16. Aliza Plener Cover, The Eighth Amendment’s Lost Jurors: Death Qualification and Evolving 
Standards of Decency, 92 IND. L.J. 113, 133 (2016). 
17. Logan A. Yelderman, Monica K. Miller & Clayton D. Peoples, Capital-izing Jurors: How Death 
Qualification Relates to Jury Composition, Jurors’ Perceptions, and Trial Outcomes, in 2 ADVANCES 
IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 35 (Brian H. Bornstein & Monica K. Miller eds., 2016). 
18. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2267, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/ar-
chive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm [https://perma.cc/3HQY-SSVA] (permitting capital punish-
ment, prior to August 2018, “if this is the only possible way of effectively defending lives 
against the unjust aggressor”). 
19. See, e.g., Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 15 (describing questions asked of prospective jurors in that case). 
20. Dan Majors, Scalia States His Case for Morals, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 25, 2011), 
http://old.post-gazette.com/pg/11268/1177453-53-0.stm [https://perma.cc/W4CH-DJQQ]. 
the pope and the capital juror 
603 
thought that Catholic doctrine held the death penalty to be immoral, I would 
resign . . . . I could not be a part of a system that imposes it.”21 
Today, more Catholic adherents, following Pope Francis’s directive, may be 
unwilling to even consider imposing death because doing so would run directly 
contrary to Catholic teachings. They will be readily struck from capital jury ser-
vice. These now-excludable Catholic jurors may have long held reservations 
about capital punishment, in keeping with Pope John Paul II’s encyclical nar-
rowing of the permissible circumstances for the death penalty in the 1990s.22 
Before Pope Francis’s unequivocal prohibition, however, such Catholics may 
have been death-averse—but still qualified—jurors. 
When a death-averse juror does make it to the jury box, she may be a holdout 
for life. Most jurisdictions require jury unanimity to sentence a defendant to 
death,23 and the presence of a single juror with moral qualms about capital pun-
ishment can therefore be determinative. Today, however, more observant Cath-
olics will not reach the jury box—and the net effect may be more pro-death juries 
and more capital convictions. For individual defendants, a change in the rate of 
disqualification during Witherspoon proceedings may be the difference between 
life and death. 
The number of additional jurors struck after the Pope’s proclamation will 
depend on multiple factors, including how many Catholics will change their 
moral stances in accordance with the Catechism, and whether, if asked, they will 
state in court that their religious views will impair their ability to follow the 
judge’s instructions and consider the death penalty (or, as in Uttecht, otherwise 
cause the judge to believe that they are “substantially impaired”24). The more 




22. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 18. The assumption was that “the cases 
in which the execution of the offender is an absolute necessity ‘are very rare, if not practically 
nonexistent.’” Id. (citing Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae § 56 (1995), http://w2.vatican
.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium 
-vitae.html [https://perma.cc/5TUB-BQDX]). 
23. Life Verdict or Hung Jury? How States Treat Non-Unanimous Jury Votes in Capital-Sentencing 
Proceedings, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org 
/Non-Unanimous-Jury-Votes-in-Capital-Sentencing-Proceedings [https://perma.cc/J2PE 
-UDVE] (listing, by jurisdiction, the consequences of non-unanimous jury votes, and con-
cluding that more than seventy percent of jurisdictions mandate a life sentence in such cir-
cumstances). 
24. Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 18. 
25. Moreover, after the Pope’s declaration, prosecutors may show a greater inclination to strate-
gically exercise peremptory strikes against Catholics—including those who express no inten-
tion to follow Catholic teaching on this issue. 
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I do not claim that all of these now-excludable jurors would otherwise have 
been seated on the jury. Prosecutors surely would have struck at least some of 
them through peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges are discretionary 
strikes, not based on proof of bias or ineligibility to serve, that may be exercised 
for any reason that does not run afoul of equal protection.26 In capital cases, 
prosecutors may choose to exercise peremptory challenges to strike death-averse 
but qualified jurors, including Catholics.27 However, unlike for-cause chal-
lenges, which are unlimited, the prosecution and defense are generally each al-
located only a limited number of peremptory strikes.28 The decision to peremp-
torily strike a juror, therefore, comes with the cost of foregoing an alternative 
peremptory strike. In contrast, if prosecutors can exclude more jurors for cause 
going forward, they will be able to free up peremptory challenges to strike other 
death-averse jurors who might otherwise have been seated. In any given case, a 
more pro-death jury will be the result. 
i i .  unmooring punishment from the community  
A second potential consequence of the Pope’s declaration is that capital juries 
will be less representative of their communities. Catholics, as a group, may be 
less likely to serve on capital juries, and the community’s most serious decisions 
about guilt and punishment may be made in the absence of their collective per-
spectives and participation. 
The Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to guarantee a jury selected 
“from a representative cross section of the community.”29 The Supreme Court 
has explained that a representative jury is critical both to its democratic function 
as a bulwark “against the exercise of arbitrary power” and to its legitimating func-
tion as the protector of “public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice 
 
26. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (prohibiting prosecution from exercising peremp-
tory strikes based on race); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting the 
same based on gender). 
27. Cover, supra note 16, at 134 (2016) (reporting, based on study of capital voir dire proceedings 
in Louisiana, that “in one trial, the state ultimately peremptorily struck three of the five jurors 
who were unsuccessfully challenged under Witherspoon; in another trial, two of three; and in 
another trial, two of three.”); Bruce J. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in 
Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1982) 
(reporting that in one judicial district in Florida, “the prosecution used peremptory challenges 
against . . . 77% of the scrupled jurors.”). 
28. Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 592, 601 (2013). 
29. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). 
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system.”30 Both of these functions are damaged “if the jury pool is made up of 
only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded 
from the pool.”31 
These normative concerns would surely be implicated if Catholics were ex-
cluded wholesale from capital jury service. The Supreme Court’s doctrine in this 
area, however, would likely not recognize a fair-cross-section violation even in 
that extreme situation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has found the fair-cross-sec-
tion requirement to be inapplicable in the context of death qualification.32 In 
Lockhart v. McCree,33 the Court held that death qualification cannot violate the 
Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section guarantee on two grounds. It first rea-
soned that this protection only applies to the composition of the jury pool or 
venire, not to the selection of the petit jury.34 The Court went on to hold that so-
called “Witherspoon-excludables” are not a “distinctive group” for purposes of 
the fair-cross-section requirement.35 
The Pope’s recent announcement may put pressure on that second rationale, 
particularly if Catholic adherents are removed wholesale from capital juries. For 
while the diverse amalgamation of death penalty opponents may not constitute 
a “distinctive group,” there is a much stronger argument that Catholic adherents 
do. More than fifty years ago, the Court sweepingly proclaimed that “prospective 
jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional ex-
clusion of any of [the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical 
groups of the community].”36 Despite this dictum, the Court has never actually 
held that religious affiliates—as opposed to members of racial, ethnic, or gender 
groups37—comprise a “distinctive group” under the fair-cross-section require-
ment. And in developing other constitutional doctrines regulating jury selection, 
the Court has considered racial and gender discrimination more readily than re-
ligious discrimination.38 
 
30. Id. at 530. 
31. Id. 
32. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-77 (1986). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 173-74. 
35. Id. at 174-77. 
36. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (emphasis added). 
37. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175 (citing the Court’s recognition of “distinctive groups” based on race, 
gender, and ethnicity). 
38. The Court has held that peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of race, see Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), or gender, see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), 
violate the Equal Protection Clause, but it has yet to extend this principle to religious discrim-
ination. Some scholars have distinguished between peremptory challenges based on religious 
affiliation and challenges based on religiously motivated beliefs, arguing that the former is 
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Thus, although the Court is unlikely to prohibit the disqualification of ob-
servant Catholics under the fair-cross-section requirement, the jury’s democratic 
role as a check against government overreaching, as well as its legitimating role 
in making criminal punishment appear fair to the community, are both threat-
ened if Catholics are excluded from participation in capital juries. From a theo-
retical perspective, such diminished representativeness undermines the moral 
justification for punishment. Theorists have for centuries debated how to defend 
the violence of criminal punishment. One key justification that has emerged is 
that criminal punishment is the expression of the shared moral condemnation of 
the community as a whole.39 In other work, I have argued that, in keeping with 
this expressive idea, a legitimate criminal justice system requires, at a minimum, 
near-consensus-level support for punishment; in this arena, where the state’s 
coercive power over the individual is at its peak, bare majoritarian acceptance is 
insufficient.40 Yet when a particular group—here, Catholic adherents—is ex-
cluded from even participating in the decision to impose punishment in the most 
serious cases, the collective expression of the community is lost, and a genuine 
problem of legitimacy arises. Even if—as seems likely—the Court never recog-
nizes a fair-cross-section problem here, widespread exclusion of Catholic jurors 
would entail significant costs to the moral legitimacy of the criminal justice sys-
tem. 
i i i .  skewing indicators of “evolving standards of 
decency”  
The third potential problematic effect of the Pope’s declaration flows from 
the first two, and it involves a broader impact on the Court’s constitutional as-
sessment of the death penalty. In attempting to decipher society’s “evolving 
standards of decency,” the Court has looked most favorably to two primary “ob-
jective indicator[s]” of contemporary values: state legislation and capital jury 
 
impermissible while the latter passes constitutional muster. See, e.g., Daniel M. Hinkle, Per-
emptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation: Are They Constitutional?, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
139, 141 (2005). 
39. E.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102-110 (First Free Press Paper-
back ed., 1964); JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERV-
ING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95 (1970); James Fitzjames Stephen, 2 A HIS-
TORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative 
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 594-95 (1996); Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: 
The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1496 (2016). 
40. Aliza Plener Cover, Supermajoritarian Criminal Justice, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3262794. 
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verdicts.41 Thus capital jury verdicts play a dual role in the American system of 
capital punishment. They decide the fate of individual capital defendants, and 
they signal to the Supreme Court the contemporary values of the community, 
which in turn affect the punishment’s constitutionality. 
Perversely, the Eighth Amendment doctrine fails to account for the distorting 
effect of death qualification upon capital jury verdicts, and simply treats these 
verdicts as value statements reflecting the pro-death sentiments of the commu-
nity at large.42 Unless and until public opinion swings strongly enough to pro-
duce legislative change, the first indicator of “evolving standards of decency,” 
state legislation, will remain constant. But as discussed above, Pope Francis’s 
proclamation may very well have a more immediate effect of increasing the num-
ber of jury verdicts of death. This increase will evidence to the Supreme Court 
greater public acceptance for the death penalty—even though the verdicts are 
obtained only by striking a growing number of citizens opposed to the death 
penalty, and by excluding Catholic adherents, as a group, from a key part of the 
constitutional conversation. This dynamic creates what I call a “buffer effect” 
around death qualification: death qualification insulates death verdicts from the 
effects of social change, and it does so by slowing down the responsiveness of 
trial outcomes to changing values. 
Under the current constitutional framework, a shift in public opinion against 
the death penalty can affect the judicially recognized “objective indicator[s]” of 
“evolving standards of decency” in at least three ways. First, if the shift is strong 
enough, it may lead to legislative abolition. This effect likely requires the greatest 
swing in public opinion—enough to produce a statewide legislative majority. 
Second, an intermediate swing may disincentivize prosecutors from charging 
crimes capitally, and thus decrease the number of death verdicts. When public 
opinion shifts spottily, with uneven geographic distribution, local prosecutorial 
discretion may be more affected than statewide legislative action.43 With either 
of these two types of strong shifts in public opinion, judicially observable “ob-
jective indicator[s]” will move in the same direction as society’s values; the ob-
jective indicators will accurately reflect that standards of decency are evolving 
away from capital punishment. 
 
41. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334-335 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Court’s reliance on other indicia has been more controversial 
and, in modern years, relegated to supporting footnotes or mere confirmation of the existence 
of societal consensus. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
575-78 (2005). 
42. Cover, supra note 16, at 128. 
43. Robert J. Smith, Bidish J. Sarma & Sophie Cull, The Way the Court Gauges Consensus (and How 
to Do It Better), 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2397, 2424 (2014). 
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However, in any case where the shift in public sentiment away from the death 
penalty is not strong enough to prompt legislative abolition or prosecutorial ab-
stention, a third effect may nonetheless ensue: the removal for cause of a signif-
icant number of citizens from capital juries.44 With more Witherspoon exclusions, 
juries will be more likely both to convict45 and to sentence the defendant to 
death.46 And although society, in the aggregate, will be more disapproving of the 
death penalty, the judicially observable “objective indicator[s]” will move in the 
opposite direction: toward the appearance of acceptance of capital punishment. 
These three possible effects show that “objective indicator[s]” will not nec-
essarily track our society’s actual “evolving standards of decency.” Because of the 
practice of death qualification, there may be an intermediate stage—before the 
tipping point for legislative reform or a change in prosecutorial practice—at 
which an increase in the number of citizens staunchly opposed to the death pen-
alty will actually increase death verdicts. At this intermediate stage, a moderate 
increase in opposition to the death penalty may make it look like the society is in 
fact more pro-death. 
The Supreme Court has never recognized nor accounted for the distorting 
effect of death qualification upon its “evolving standards of decency” doctrine. 
Now would be an important moment for it to do so. 
conclusion  
The Pope’s declaration that the death penalty is impermissible without ex-
ception may influence our nation’s “evolving standards of decency.” The extent 
of its influence remains to be seen. In time, the change in Catholic doctrine may 
push the nation toward legislative or judicial abolition. Yet for now, this shift 
may mean that more Catholic jurors, some of whom already may have been 
skeptical about the death penalty, can now be lawfully struck for cause from 
death penalty cases. Their voices may be eliminated from the capital jury, on the 
 
44. There remains the possibility that the Pope’s announcement will have a softer impact on some 
citizens, such that they will be skeptical of the death penalty but not firmly opposed, and the 
effect of death qualification may be moderated. Yet the possibility of increasing Witherspoon 
disqualification is a significant one. 
45. Jurors more supportive of the death penalty are more likely to convict capital defendants, prior 
to and distinct from the penalty phase. See e.g., Mike Allen et al., Impact of Juror Attitudes About 
the Death Penalty on Juror Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 715, 724-25 (1998); Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors’ 
Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984). 
46. See, e.g., Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries’ Bias and the Benefits of 
True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 791-93 (2006). 
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whole replaced by jurors who are less death-averse—with ripple effects for indi-
vidual defendants, for the legitimacy of the punishment, and for the Court’s 
reading of society’s “evolving standards of decency.” This peculiarity—that a so-
cietal shift away from the death penalty may only strengthen its administration—
offers a window into the troubling effects of death qualification upon the practice 
of capital punishment in the United States. 
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